On September 18, 2024, Ali Bongo Ondimba, the former Gabonese president who was overthrown after fourteen years in power, announced his withdrawal from political life while requesting clemency for his detained associates. Behind this façade of national reconciliation lies a political strategy often employed by authoritarian regimes: avoiding justice while preserving influence. This renunciation is not only a matter of survival for Ali Bongo but also a threat to the democratic aspirations of Gabon and the entire Central African region.
A Calculated Renunciation to Escape Justice
At first glance, Ali Bongo’s withdrawal appears to be an act of redemption, a call for unity after years of controversial governance. However, as Tony Saich explains in his work Dictatorship and Demand, autocrats often use such tactics to deflect attention from their past abuses. This renunciation seems more like an attempt to evade justice, similar to what was observed in other authoritarian regimes. For instance, in the Republic of the Congo in 1992, outgoing President Sassou Nguesso’s « I take responsibility » statement had no judicial consequences. Despite previous crimes and abuses, he was able to run for the 1997 presidential election and return to power through a military coup. His political-military apparatus remained intact after the 1990–1992 political transition.
A Sham Transition: The Continuity of the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG)
Under the leadership of General Brice Oligui Nguema, the Gabonese transition, which was supposed to break with the old regime, is primarily dominated by members of Ali Bongo’s Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG). The Ndong Sima II government is proof of this: out of 26 ministers, the majority come from the PDG, which has been in power for decades. The Alternance 2023 platform, which had claimed victory in the presidential election, has been almost entirely excluded from the process, thus diminishing the hope for genuine change.
As Samuel P. Huntington noted in Political Order in Changing Societies, a transition without fundamental reforms is merely disguised continuity. The composition of the new government suggests that this Gabonese transition is increasingly a façade that allows the PDG to maintain its grip on the state.
A Threat to Democracy in Central Africa
Suppose this transition fails to break from the previous regime genuinely. In that case, Gabon risks becoming a worrying model for other authoritarian regimes in Central Africa. In the Republic of the Congo, the Congolese Party of Labour, which has been in power for decades, might be inspired by this « transition » to reinvent itself while maintaining its autocratic practices. Similarly, Cameroon, ruled by Paul Biya for over 40 years, could see in this example a way to prolong its regime without accountability. As Nic Cheeseman warned in Democracy in Africa, a poorly managed democratic transition can lead to widespread regression.
A Deceptive Transition: One Ali Bongo May Hide Another
Ali Bongo’s renunciation not only allows him to avoid prosecution but also stabilizes the image of the transition led by Oligui Nguema. By keeping PDG figures in the new government, this transition becomes a disguised extension of the old regime. As Kathryn Sikkink explains in The Justice Cascade, transitional justice is crucial to prevent impunity from becoming the norm. Without the judicial exclusion of Ali Bongo and his allies, this renunciation would be merely symbolic, with no real consequences for Gabon or the Central African region.
